He was ousted by another soldier, Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida, who declared himself
military president. While he was celebrating his 100 days in office, Babangida granted an
interview to Newswatch.
Abiyamo is reproducing for your reading pleasure, the interview: On November 22, 1985,
President Ibrahim Babangida spent 105 minutes with a Newswatch team of Dele Giwa, Ray Ekpu,
Dan Agbese, Yakubu Mohammed and May Ellen Ezekiel. During the interview, he talked about
himself, the parting of ways with Buhari and Idiagbon, the challenges facing his 100-day old
government and his hope for the future.
Below are the excerpts as compiled then by Dele Olojede: Q: When did it occur to you that you
can be the president? IBB: On August 27, 1985. People still believe that I nursed a lot of ambition,
but I don’t think it ever occurred to me before that time. Q: How were you chosen as president? IBB:
The system was like all other coup d’etats: people who are going to get involved will tell
you what is happening and what the intention (with regard to yourself) is. I went through it in
1975 when we were planning to change the government. Q: Did the same process apply in 1983? IBB:
Yes, it did.
We sat down and declared we were going to change the civilian government at the time and we also agreed
that we were going to make Buhari the head of state. I told Buhari what was happening, that he was
going to be the head of state and I would be the head of the army. Q: Oh! You told him that you would
be the head of the army? IBB:
I was mandated to tell him he was going to be the head of state because he is a very close friend.
Q: Was he reluctant: was he eager; was he happy? IBB: Well, I think his reaction was natural.
The moment somebody confronts you with a situation like this, you have to be talked to for quite some
time and we did post that. Q: Was he part of the coup planning? IBB: He knew it was coming. Q:
In your own case, what was your reaction when you were approached by the coup planners? IBB:
I saw it as a challenge. Here you are in a situation where your professional colleagues unanimously
agree that this is what they want you to do So I felt they had a lot of confidence in
me as a person, and could it be fair really to say no? Perhaps I could if I wanted, but before
that time, most of the officers who were involved had gone through a lot of psychological, emotional torture.
As chief of army staff, I believed I had some responsibilities to the nation, and I so accepted.
Q: Did it occur to you that Buhari, being a close friend of yours, night feel you stabbed him in the back?
IBB: It is natural he might feel the way you expressed it, but I think the situation was such
that there was no way we could allow that sort of situation to continue.
Q: At what point did you start disagreeing with Buhari? What were the serious issues of disagreement?
IBB: First of all, we had all accepted that whatever decisions we came upon were going to be
collective, and I think to a certain extent, we succeeded. But as time rolled by, we had to disagree
on a number of issues which were both of national and international interest.
There were many concerted efforts to mend these areas, but there was the general opinion
of insecurity and dissatisfaction even among the members of the SMC at the time.
As the chief of army staff, quite a number of them who were my colleagues and even my juniors
continued to come to me to talk about one thing or the other, I did quite a lot of talking to them,
you know, just to make sure they were not seen to be opposed to the leader.
But I think that could not continue for a long time – there had to be a breaking point.
That point was the result of the cumulative effect of so many things that happened during that
short period. Q: When did you sense that this was setting in. IBB: There was distrust. People would go
to him and say, ‘be careful, that man is gunning for your post.’’
And when people create an environment of insecurity around you, you are bound to get suspicious and
start pulling back. Q: What engendered this feeling of insecurity among the officers and members of the SMC?
IBB: The NSO, for example, had made a lot of reports about individuals. There was also the feeling that
everybody’s telephone was tapped. Q: They tapped your phone too? IBB: I can assure you they did.
I even have the recordings. One of them was where my little daughter was talking. We have retrieved most
of these tapes. Q: What was your relationship with Idiagbon? IBB: I think it was a cordial relationship.
We have known each other for 17, 18 years, since we were young officers. We might disagree on a
number of issues of principle, but not to the extent of being at each other’s throats.
Q: What about General Abacha’s statement that Commodore Ebitu Ukiwe cannot be the Number Two man in the administration? IBB: Don’t forget that there is the political leadership. We have said that the armed
forces are subordinate to the political leadership. Ukiwe now occupies a political position
and he too respects the service chiefs because of the profession.
The profession demands that a service chief is a superior officer, and therefore, he has to
give that professional respect. The service chiefs are also expected to give him that political
respect. Between 1976 and 1979, Shehu Yar’adua was the chief of staff, supreme headquarter.
He was junior to General Danjuma, for example.
He respected General Danjuma first as a senior officer and his service chief. General Danjuma
also respected him as a number two man to General Obasanjo. If Yar’adua carried himself in excess
of what should have been normal, he would have had a bit of problem. I would say Idiagbon was
not able to blend the two together. Q: You defended your minister of finance Kalu’s right to
express personal opinions on the IMF loan debate. What is your personal view? IBB:
As a president or as a Nigerian?
Q: As a Nigerian citizen. IBB: Well, both the president and the Nigerian and Nigerians, right? I
would not deviate from my vow that whatever decision the AFRC is going to take will be guided by
the majority opinion. But the important thing is that we should make it known to the nothing
what options are open to us. I think the committee is trying to do that.
Q.Why did you open NSO cells to the public IBB: Well, when I made my first pronouncement, I
talked about the atrocity, call it the inhuman treatment, meted to people. To make the public
see that we did not create any imaginary problem, we had to do it. Q: The release of the young Dantata,
who was held for alleged drug trafficking, has led to what people now call the sacred cow syndrome.
What is the rationale? IBB: How do you mean sacred cow? Q: That he is from strong, wealthy family.
That is why he was not prosecuted. IBB: Let me tell you my position as far as this is concerned. Here
is a case that doesn’t concern the presidency, because the others who were caught did not go through
the presidency.
The cases went through the normal process, so that I can see his case being treated that way. So
apart from what one is reading in the papers and so on, why should his case attract the attention
of the president? He is no more Nigerian than any other person convicted. But because of newspaper
reports, maybe one should take some interest just to find out what happened.
I spoke to the inspector-general of police about it, and I was told he was granted bail because
the director of public prosecution said there was insufficient evidence to try him. Q: Mr. President,
was the issue of political detainees ever discussed in the defunct SMC? IBB: Oh yes,
we had a lot of discussions on this, almost daily, either in council or out of it.
It is okay if somebody has committed an offence, but I think there is no moral reason to
detain somebody for one year and eight months without preparing a formal charge against him.
If there is a case and it is established, by all means the person should be tried and punished.
If you can’t establish anything but you still suspect him, keep him under surveillance
and ask him to report back regularly.
I think it is wrong to believe that any Nigerian is potentially bad. I have heard people say
the best way to deal with Nigerians is to apply repressive measures. I think it is a
wrong concept. You cannot arrogate purity to yourself. Q: A factor has emerged in the administration
called the Langtang Mafia. How come you have in key positions such a large number of
people from only one local government area? IBB: It is a strange coincidence.
It happened in the past, when people were talking of the Bida Mafia; at one time about five or six of
us were from Bida holding key posts in the civilian and even in the military regime. I was chief of
army staff, Mamman Vatsa was minister of Abuja, Brigadier Duba and Sani Sami were both governors
and General Nasko was a member of the SMC and commander of artillery. Within the military,
you always find a situation like that, but it is a passing thing.
As it has happened, the minister of defence Domkat Bali comes from Langtang, so is the minister of
internal affairs, John Shagaya, managing director of Nigerian Airways, Colonel Bamfa and the
ambassador to the United Nations. The last two were there before the present government.
And then, there is Brigadier Dogonyaro, an armoured officer. He is the next most senior armoured
officer (after the president) and we just had to make him the GOC. So maybe by the time we all get
phased out, there will be no more Langtang or Bida Mafia. Q: What are your views on federal
character and quota system? IBB: Federal character is enshrined in our constitution
and there is nothing we can do about it.
Quota system had been a burning issue in the past, but I think that, given the academic attainment
in the last few years, especially in states, one would consider disadvantaged, the gap is being
bridged very fast. So, this aspect of quota, I think within a short time, everybody will
be in the common pool to compete. Q: There is the other Mafia, the Kaduna Mafia. People are
saying they have been dislodged and they are unhappy.
IBB: Well, I have been trying to identify this mafia; I haven’t yet. Q: When we did the
report on your becoming President, we named them; only one denied being a member. So we
assume that the others are members. IBB: At one time, people thought I was a member.
That’s why I say I’m trying to find out who the members are. Q: On the appointment of ministers,
what happened to Bauchi, Benue, Ondo and Kwara? The constitution mentioned at least one minister
from each state. IBB: The only way we could meet all the requirements is to do what the
civilians did – create a minister for and minister of, so you end up with about 43 ministers.
Given the present situation, we are unable to do that, so we thought that there are three principal
organs of government – the National Council of Ministers, National Council of States and the
Armed Forces Ruling Council. You will find that in the AFRC, we have representatives from Ondo State.
If there is no minister from Benue, we have governors from there, and so on.
Actually, only Bauchi is not represented in any of the three bodies, and we are trying to do something
about it. Q: But did you receive any threat from any quarter because you made a rather strong
statement on internal subversion? IBB: When I talked to the military officers, I tried to make
them look inward.
So I said we should shift emphasis from external aggression to internal security. Just before I said so,
the police were addressing their minds to the religious riots in the country. These
extremists don’t give any notice when they strike. Therefore, we have to be alert to deal
with them with incisive military skill.
Q: On fundamental human rights, do you plan to abrogate Decree 2? IBB: We did say we are looking at
all the decrees with a view to abrogating or modifying them. The decree has been in existence.
It was there 1975 through 1979. Such laws are in almost all countries of the world, including
developed countries. What I think happened was that there was a general abuse of the decree, which
contradicts the whole concept.
When we had the decree between 1975 and 1979, it was used only once in the four years. I think it was
the arbitrary use of the decree by the last regime that brought about real worries. It should not
be used unless it is absolutely necessary – where the security of the state is being threatened.
Q: Is the president in favour of public officers declaring their assets publicly? IBB: I think
it is proper. I declared mine before a public notary. My religion says whatever God gives you, you
should not hide it. Q: What is happening to Shagari and Ekwueme? IBB: We set up three
panels to look into convictions under Decree 3 and another to look into the cases of people
convicted under 7, 20 and 22, and yet another to examine the cases of political
prisoners who are either on conditional release or are still being detained.
Ekwueme and Shagari fall under this category. We have a high court judge in charge of that special
investigation panel. Their findings would be the determining factor. Q: What of Buhari and
Idiagbon? IBB: They are very well. Q: Why are they being held? IBB: It is for their personal security.
Q: What about Magoro? IBB: He is fine. He was never arrested. He was retired with some
colleagues of his. Q: What is your attitude to privatization of public corporations? IBB: We are
giving very serious thought to it.
Federal government investment in these corporations total N19 billion, and not one percent of that
N19 billion comes back to government as revenue. Sooner or later, government has to make a
decision, N19 billion is a lot of money.
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